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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
The Pennsylvania House of Representatives begins 
most legislative sessions with a prayer.  The practice has two 
features that are challenged in this appeal.  First, the House 
invites guest chaplains to offer the prayer, but it excludes 
nontheists (those who do not espouse belief in a god or gods, 
though not necessarily atheists) from serving as chaplains on 
the theory that “prayer” presupposes a higher power.  Second, 
visitors to the House chamber pass a sign asking them to stand 
for the prayer, and the Speaker of the House requests that 
audience members “please rise” immediately before the 
prayer.  At least once a House security guard pressured two 
visitors who refused to stand. 
A group of nontheists have challenged the theists-only 
policy under the Establishment, Free Exercise, Free Speech,1 
and Equal Protection Clauses2 of our Constitution.  As to the 
Establishment Clause, we uphold the policy because only 
theistic prayer can satisfy the historical purpose of appealing 
for divine guidance in lawmaking, the basis for the Supreme 
                                              
1  The First Amendment states in part that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. I.  These limits on 
government action are applied to the states per Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) 
(Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303–04 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause); and Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (Free Speech Clause). 
 
2  “[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Court taking as a given that prayer presumes a higher power.  
For the Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal Protection 
Clauses, we hold that legislative prayer is government speech 
not open to attack via those channels. 
The nontheists also challenge as unconstitutionally 
coercive the requests to “please rise” for the prayer.  We hold 
that the single incident involving pressure from a security 
guard is moot.  As for the sign outside the House chamber and 
the Speaker’s introductory request that guests “please rise,” we 
hold that these are not coercive. 
Thus we affirm in part and reverse in part the ruling of 
the District Court. 
Background 
A. Guest Chaplain Policy – Exclusion of Nontheists 
A member of the Pennsylvania House or a guest 
chaplain opens most legislative sessions with a prayer.  A guest 
chaplain must be “a member of a regularly established church 
or religious organization.”  The House defines “opening 
prayer” as a chance for its members “to seek divine 
intervention in their work and their lives.”  Taken together, the 
House rules do not allow nontheists to give the opening prayer. 
Once a guest chaplain is selected, he or she is told to 
craft a prayer “respectful of all religious beliefs.”  Fields v. 
Speaker of the Pa. House of Representatives, 251 F. Supp. 3d 
772, 777 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (Fields I).  The 203 members of the 
House “com[e] from a wide variety of faiths,” so “efforts to 
deliver an inter-faith prayer are greatly appreciated.”  Fields v. 
Speaker of the Pa. House of Representatives, 327 F. Supp. 3d 
748, 751 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (Fields II).  Still, no House member 
reviews the prayer ahead of time. 
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From 2008 to 2016 the House prayer practice was as 
follows.  For 678 legislative sessions, 575 began with a prayer.  
Of those prayers, 310 were offered by House members and 265 
by guest chaplains.  Among the 265 guest chaplains were 238 
Christian clergy, 23 Jewish rabbis, three Muslim imams, and 
one monotheistic (yet otherwise unrecognizable) speaker.  
Fields I, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 777.  The House branched out in 
2017 from the Abrahamic faiths with its first Sikh guest 
chaplain.  Fields II, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 752. 
The plaintiffs here wish to offer the opening prayer as 
well.  They represent a variety of nontheist organizations, 
including Secular Humanists, Unitarian Universalists, and 
Freethinkers.3  Most of these groups self-identify as “religious” 
organizations, and their practices parallel those of a church.  
For instance, they gather regularly to discuss their worldviews, 
study important texts, observe annual celebrations, and 
participate in community service.  Fields I, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 
776.  Their “clergy” even perform weddings and officiate at 
funerals.  In short, they look and act like a church or synagogue 
in all ways but one: they do not profess belief in the existence 
of a higher power. 
For this reason alone, the House denied their requests to 
offer a prayer.  Each group had proposed an uplifting secular 
message — a “nontheistic” prayer touching on themes such as 
equality, unity, decency, hope, peace, compassion, tolerance, 
and justice.  Fields II, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 750.  But because 
                                              
3  While not identical, Secular Humanism and 
Freethought both posit that humans can be moral without any 
god; truth and morality should be based on logic, reason, and 
evidence, rather than on authority, tradition, or dogma.  The 
nontheistic branches of Unitarian Universalism assert no creed, 
instead emphasizing tolerance and intellectual freedom. 
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their proposed invocations would not appeal to a “higher 
power,” they were turned away.  Id. at 753. 
B. Prayer Practice – Request to “Please Rise” 
Two features of the prayer practice changed in response 
to this lawsuit.  First, the Speaker of the House had asked 
guests to “please rise.”  Id.  In 2017 he elaborated that guests 
“please rise as able.”  Id.  Second, a sign outside the House 
chamber had explained that legislative sessions begin with a 
prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance, and it had asked that all 
guests “who are physically able” rise “during this order of 
business.”  After this lawsuit, “physically” was dropped.  Id. at 
754.  On appeal, the parties dispute only whether the pre-2017 
practice was unconstitutionally coercive. 
 The nontheists also challenge the coercive nature of one 
incident in 2012.  After the Speaker’s general request to 
“please rise,” plaintiffs Brian Fields and Scott Rhoades 
remained seated.  A House security guard singled them out and 
pressured them to stand.  Id. at 753.  However, they were not 
asked to leave, and no action was taken against them. 
C. Procedural History 
The leaders of several nontheist groups, along with the 
groups themselves, brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against the Speaker of the House, the House Parliamentarian, 
and several House members.  The plaintiffs took aim at the 
guest chaplain policy and the practice of asking that guests 
“please rise” for the prayer.  First, they asserted that the policy 
of excluding nontheists from serving as guest chaplains 
violated the Establishment, Free Speech, Free Exercise, and 
Equal Protection Clauses.  Second, they claimed that asking 
guests to “please rise” for the prayer was unconstitutionally 
coercive in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
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At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the District Court 
winnowed the claims to the alleged Establishment Clause 
violations.  Reasoning that legislative prayer is government 
speech rather than speech by private citizens, the Court 
dismissed the claims brought under the Free Exercise, Free 
Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses.  The Establishment 
Clause claims survived, however, because the Court needed a 
record at summary judgment to determine (1) “[w]hether 
history and tradition sanctify the House’s line of demarcation 
between theistic and nontheistic chaplains,” and (2) whether 
the Speaker’s request to “please rise” for the prayer was 
unconstitutionally coercive.  Fields I, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 789. 
After discovery, both sides moved for summary 
judgment.  The Court held that the guest chaplain policy 
violated the Establishment Clause and issued a permanent 
injunction.  As for the requests to “please rise” for the opening 
prayer, it held that the current policy (amended in response to 
the lawsuit) was not coercive, but that the pre-2017 policy was. 
Both sides have appealed. 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
the Court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions 
of law de novo.  VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 
F.3d 273, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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Discussion 
A. Guest Chaplain Policy – Establishment Clause 
Challenge 
Principally before us is whether the Pennsylvania House 
may intentionally exclude nontheists from offering prayers to 
open the legislative session.  Because the House’s policy 
preferring theistic over nontheistic prayers fits squarely within 
the historical tradition of legislative prayer, we part with the 
District Court on this point and uphold the prayer policy. 
1. Pennsylvania’s Policy is Consistent with Historical 
Practice. 
(i) Background on the Historical Framework — 
History supplies our method of analyzing cases involving 
legislative prayer.  In Establishment Clause challenges like 
this, we ask “whether the prayer practice” in question “fits 
within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state 
legislatures.”  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 
(2014).  The early legislative practice of those who drafted the 
Establishment Clause “reveal[s] their intent” as to its scope.  
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983); see also New 
Doe Child #1 v. United States, 901 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 
2018) (“[H]istorical practices often reveal what the 
Establishment Clause was originally understood to permit.”).  
In other words, we employ “a history and tradition test.”  Am. 
Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2092 (2019) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Freedom From Religion 
Found., Inc. v. Cty. of Lehigh, No. 17-3581, 2019 WL 
3720709, — F.3d — (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 2019) (noting “the 
Supreme Court’s more recent focus on evaluating challenges 
to government action in the context of historical practices and 
understandings,” id. at *2, and explaining that “[a] practice’s 
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fit within our Nation’s public traditions may confirm its 
constitutionality,” id. at *5). 
Twice the Supreme Court has drawn on early 
congressional practice to uphold legislative prayer.  It 
emphasized that Congress approved the draft of the First 
Amendment in the same week it established paid congressional 
chaplains to provide opening prayers.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790; 
see also Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 (“The First Congress 
made it an early item of business to appoint and pay official 
chaplains, and both the House and Senate have maintained the 
office virtually uninterrupted since that time.”).  Congress 
approved theistic religious expression in other ways as well; a 
day after proposing the First Amendment, it “urged President 
Washington to proclaim ‘a day of public thanksgiving and 
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts, 
the many and signal favours of Almighty God.’”  Lynch v 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 n.2 (1984) (quoting A. Stokes & 
L. Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States 87 (rev. 1st 
ed. 1964)). 
These insights — paired with the general use of history 
as the decisional framework — paved the way to the holdings 
in both Marsh and Town of Greece.  The former upheld 
Nebraska’s practice of offering legislative prayer by the same 
paid Presbyterian minister for 16 years.  “In light of the 
unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, 
there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative 
sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our 
society.”  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.  Likewise, Town of Greece 
upheld sectarian (for example, invocations “in Jesus’ name” 
for a given sect) as opposed to ecumenical (for example, 
nonsectarian or nondenominational invocations to a “generic 
God”) legislative prayer by guest chaplains.  Town of Greece, 
572 U.S. at 572–73.  The Court refused to “sweep away” a 
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practice that “was accepted by the Framers and has withstood 
the critical scrutiny of time and political change.”  Id. at 577. 
The D.C. Circuit recently deployed this historical 
framework to answer the same question before us today.  See 
Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Tatel, J.).  
There it considered the U.S. House of Representatives’ 
practice of excluding nontheists from offering legislative 
prayers.  Following the path charted by Marsh and Town of 
Greece, the Court defined its task as “determin[ing] whether 
that practice falls within the tradition the Supreme Court has 
recognized as consistent with the Establishment Clause.”  Id. 
at 1130.  Put another way, “does the House’s decision to limit 
the opening prayer to religious prayer fit ‘within the tradition 
long followed in Congress and the state legislatures’?”  Id. 
(quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577).  The answer was 
“yes.”  Id. 
Even more recently, the Supreme Court has expanded 
its historical framework beyond the confines of legislative 
prayer.  In rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a 
Christian cross commemorating World War I on state property, 
the Court held that the memorial “must be viewed in [its] 
historical context.”  Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074.  It also 
announced “a presumption of constitutionality for 
longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices.”  Id. at 2082.  
Indeed, our Court just reiterated the “strong presumption of 
constitutionality” for practices like the one before us.  See 
Freedom From Religion Found., 2019 WL 3720709, at *3 
(quoting Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085).  That presumption 
applies to the longstanding practice of theistic prayer in the 
United States; since the first congressional prayers in 1789, the 
U.S. House of Representatives “has never had an openly atheist 
or agnostic guest chaplain.”  Barker, 921 F.3d at 1122. 
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With this background on the historical framework — 
and bearing in mind the thumb on the scale for the 
constitutionality of longstanding practices like that of 
Pennsylvania House, see Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085 — we 
turn to two reasons why Pennsylvania’s practice is historically 
sound.  First, only theistic prayer can satisfy all the traditional 
purposes of legislative prayer.  Second, the Supreme Court has 
long taken as given that prayer presumes invoking a higher 
power. 
(ii) Purposes of Legislative Prayer — Legislative 
prayer has historically served many purposes, both secular and 
religious.  Because only theistic prayer can achieve them all, 
the historical tradition supports the House’s choice to restrict 
prayer to theistic invocations. 
To be sure, legislative prayer achieves several secular 
purposes.  It solemnizes the occasion by “lend[ing] gravity” to 
the proceedings and placing legislators in a “deliberative frame 
of mind.”  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587, 570.  It provides 
a moment of “quiet reflection” that “sets the mind to a higher 
purpose.”  Id. at 587.  It unifies lawmakers by inviting them “to 
reflect upon shared ideals and common ends before they 
embark on the fractious business of governing.”  Id. at 583.  
And it stresses the values of justice, peace, and wisdom.  Id. 
No surprise, then, that even the D.C. Circuit in Barker 
saw it was “at least plausible” that the word “prayer” could 
“encompass[] a secular invocation.”  921 F.3d at 1125.  
Channeling these secular purposes, at least seven state 
legislative chambers (including the Pennsylvania Senate) have 
begun to allow nontheistic invocations.  See Br. of Amici 
Curiae U.S. Reps. Jared Huffman & Jaime Raskin at 5–11. 
But, as a matter of traditional practice, a petition to 
human wisdom and the power of science does not capture the 
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full sense of “prayer,” historically understood.  At bottom, 
legislative prayers seek “divine guidance” in lawmaking.  
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.  See 
generally Br. of Amici Curiae Pa. Members of Congress at 4–
15.  They also allow the legislature to “acknowledge the place 
religion holds in the lives of many private citizens.”  Town of 
Greece, 572 U.S. at 587; see also Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 
2089 (“The practice begun by the First Congress stands out as 
. . . a recognition of the important role that religion plays in the 
lives of many Americans.  Where . . . practices with a 
longstanding history follow in that tradition, they are likewise 
constitutional.”).  And they “connect [lawmakers] to a tradition 
dating to the time of the Framers,” Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 
at 588, one that has always included a higher power. 
Finally, prayers “accommodate the spiritual needs of 
lawmakers.”  Id.  Though this purpose is now accepted by the 
Supreme Court, see id., one might wonder whether a religious 
minister can accommodate the spiritual needs of a “secular 
agnostic” member of the Pennsylvania House, see Fields II, 
327 F. Supp. 3d at 763, or vice versa.  Or, for that matter, can 
a Catholic priest in the U.S. Senate accommodate the spiritual 
needs of Chuck Schumer, or a Jewish rabbi those of Mitt 
Romney?  These questions are as old as the Republic, but they 
have been settled since the Founding.  In the Continental 
Congress, John Jay and John Rutledge opposed legislative 
prayer on the theory that the delegates were “so divided in 
religious sentiments” that they “could not join in the same act 
of worship.”  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (quotations omitted).  The 
two future Chief Justices could not see what an Episcopalian 
minister could possibly offer a Presbyterian or 
Congregationalist lawmaker.  Their view lost out, however, 
when Samuel Adams countered that “he was no bigot” and 
would gladly “hear a prayer from a gentleman of piety and 
virtue,” no matter his denomination.  Id. at 792 (quotations 
omitted); see also Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2088.  Hence we 
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take as given that an invocation by a prayer-giver of one 
theistic faith can accommodate the spiritual needs of listeners 
of other theistic faiths. 
In sum, the view that prayer “necessarily requires that a 
‘higher power’ be invoked” may be “overly narrow” by current 
standards.  Williamson v. Brevard Cty., 276 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 
1281 (M.D. Fla. 2017), aff’d in part on other grounds, 928 F.3d 
1296 (11th Cir. 2019).  But modern, evolving standards are not 
our lodestar when evaluating a practice like this; instead, past 
is prologue for our inquiry.  And history tells us that only 
theistic invocations can achieve all the purposes of legislative 
prayer.  Thus the historical tradition supports the House’s 
choice to restrict its invocations to theistic prayer. 
(iii) “Prayer” Presumes a Higher Power. — The 
Supreme Court has long taken as given that prayer presumes a 
higher power.  To begin, the Court in Marsh described 
legislative prayer as “invok[ing] Divine guidance on a public 
body entrusted with making the laws,” 463 U.S. at 792, and 
quoted with approval Justice Douglas’s statement that “we are 
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being,” id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 
(1952)).  Even the dissent in Marsh stressed that “prayer is 
fundamentally and necessarily religious,” and distinguished it 
from a nontheistic “moral sense” or “aesthetic feeling.”  Id. at 
810 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted). 
The assumption that prayer must be theistic apparently 
persuaded then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg that Congress’s 
practice of excluding nontheists from offering opening prayers 
did not violate the Establishment Clause.  See Kurtz v. Baker, 
829 F.2d 1133, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (R.B. Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  Although the challenge was dismissed on standing 
grounds, she wrote separately that she would have upheld 
Congress’s policy on the merits.  “The common feature” of 
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legislative prayer was “the invocation of ‘Divine guidance.’”  
Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).  Thus we believe later-
Justice Ginsburg would have rejected the challenger’s “claim 
of a constitutional right not to be excluded, because he is a 
nontheist, from the opportunity” to offer a prayer.  Id. at 1146. 
More recently, the notion that prayer is definitionally 
theistic suffuses the opinions in Town of Greece.  The majority 
opinion described prayer as a chance to “show respect for the 
divine,” 572 U.S. at 584, and to “address [one’s] own God or 
gods,” id. at 582.  Prayer is an “acknowledgment[] of the 
divine,” id. at 587, or of “belief in a higher power,” id. at 591.  
It is a “reference to the sacred,” id. at 581, or, more simply, it 
is “religious worship,” id. at 588 (quotations omitted).  Even 
the dissent cast legislative prayers as “[c]eremonial references 
to the divine,” id. at 635 (Kagan, J., dissenting), and, 
pejoratively, as “government-sponsored worship,” id. at 628.  
Urging nonsectarian prayer, it asserted that an ecumenical 
message would still “unite[]” listeners with “a respect paid 
higher providence.”  Id. at 632 (quoting Joyner v. Forsyth 
Cty., 653 F.3d 341, 347 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
Just as Marsh persuaded then-Judge Ginsburg that 
Congress’s policy excluding nontheistic prayers was 
permissible, Marsh and Town of Greece together convinced the 
D.C. Circuit to hold that the policy did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.  See Barker, 921 F.3d at 1121.  It 
explained that Marsh “took as a given the religious nature of 
legislative prayer,” and quoted that “we are a religious people 
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”  Id. at 1130 
(quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).  Turning to Town of Greece, 
the Court saw the same assumption that prayer requires a deity, 
stressing Town of Greece’s statement that “legislative 
prayer, while religious in nature, has long been understood as 
compatible with the Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 1131 
(quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575) (emphasis added by 
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Barker).  Since Barker, the Supreme Court has underscored the 
point yet again: “prayer is by definition religious.”  Am. 
Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087. 
Recognizing that prayer has traditionally presumed a 
higher power does not amount to “instituting a religious 
orthodoxy.”  Dissenting Op. at 10.  Our dissenting colleague 
thinks otherwise; in his view, accepting that prayer has (until 
very recently) been an entreaty to a divine being is tantamount 
to “the government actively lend[ing] its power and prestige to 
the religious theory that a ‘higher power’ or God indeed 
exists.”  Id. at 10.  But if that were so, then we would have to 
rethink settled law upholding, for example, the motto “In God 
We Trust” on our coinage.  See, e.g., New Doe Child #1, 901 
F.3d at 1019 (8th Cir. 2018); Mayle v. United States, 891 F.3d 
680, 684–86 (7th Cir. 2018); Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 
105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 
F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2010); Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 
214, 217–18 (10th Cir. 1996); O’Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 
1144, 1144 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).  We would also need 
to scrub the phrase “under God” from the Pledge of Allegiance 
— again upending established precedent.  See, e.g., Freedom 
From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 6 n.13 
(1st Cir. 2010); Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 
2010); Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 
1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Myers v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 418 
F.3d 395, 408 (4th Cir. 2005); Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. 
Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).  Instead of 
rocking the constitutional boat, today we merely observe what 
the Supreme Court has long taken as given: that prayer 
traditionally presumes a higher power.  Because this notion 
flows from the historical understanding and practice of 
legislative prayer, it lends further support to the policy of the 
Pennsylvania House.   
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Nor is our observation about traditional prayer 
“tantamount to a holding that legislative prayer must be theistic 
in nature.”  Dissenting Op. at 8 n.4 (emphasis in text).  A 
legislative body is free to open its sessions with secular 
invocations.  We hold only that it is not required to do so.   
(iv) Effect of Challengers’ Status as “Religions” — 
The nontheistic organizations that brought this challenge may 
be “religions” for First Amendment purposes.  See Torcaso v. 
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court “has moved considerably beyond the wholly theistic 
interpretation” of the term “religion.”  Africa v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 
1981).  Its understanding of “religion” now “includes 
nontheistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as theistic ones.”  
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005); 
accord Dissenting Op. at 1. 
Still, the policy of the Pennsylvania House does not 
transgress the rule against favoring “one religion over another, 
or religion over irreligion.”  McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 
545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005).  That is because “whether atheism 
is a ‘religion’ for First Amendment purposes is a . . . different 
question than whether its adherents believe in a supreme 
being.”  Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 681.  And only the latter 
question — the existence of a high power to whom one can 
pray for divine guidance in lawmaking — is a necessary 
element of traditional legislative prayer.  The nontheists here 
may be members of “religions” for First Amendment purposes, 
but, because they do not proclaim the existence of a higher 
power, they cannot offer religious prayer in the historical 
sense.  Cf. Williamson, 928 F.3d 1296 (concluding that policy 
of chaplain selection barring prayers from nontheistic Secular 
Humanists, as well as from Rastafarians, Deists, Wiccans, and 
Hindus, id. at 1313–14, was unconstitutional discrimination 
“on the basis of religion,” id. at 1316, but only as against the 
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theistic religions, id. at 1311, while refusing to decide “whether 
atheists and secular humanists must be allowed to deliver non-
theistic invocations,” id. at 1299, even as the Court recognized 
that atheistic beliefs constitute a “religion” for Establishment 
Clause purposes, id. at 1300).  And because history guides our 
inquiry in matters of legislative prayer, the Pennsylvania 
House may insist on traditional, theistic prayers. 
In doing so, the House does not “impermissibly direct[] 
or control[] the content of the prayers delivered by guest 
chaplains.”  Dissenting Op. at 13.   To the contrary, no House 
member reviews a guest chaplain’s prayer ahead of time.  
Chaplains are simply instructed to be “respectful of all 
religious beliefs,” Fields I, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 777, and are 
encouraged to “deliver an inter-faith prayer,” Fields II, 327 F. 
Supp. 3d at 751. 
2. Further Exclusions are Impermissible. 
Our decision today does not open the door to more 
extreme exclusions.  Neutrality principles emanating from 
Marsh and Town of Greece hold the historical framework in 
check and prevent grandfathering antiquated discrimination 
into the present day. 
Taken too far, importing historical legislative-prayer 
practices would justify excluding all sorts of theists.  For 
instance, Justice Scalia maintained that, in matters of “public 
acknowledgment of religious belief,” the nation’s “historical 
practices” demonstrate that the government could exclude not 
only “devout atheists” but also “polytheists” (those who 
believe in multiple gods).  McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 893 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  In the same vein, the Fourth Circuit has 
approved the exclusion of polytheist guest chaplains from 
legislative prayer.  Simpson v. Chesterfield Cty. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 286 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wilkinson, J.).  
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There a county opened its board meetings with prayers from 
the leaders of “monotheistic congregations” but denied a 
Wiccan witch the chance to offer a prayer.  Id. at 284.  The 
Court noted the more restrictive practice approved in Marsh — 
one permanent Presbyterian minister for 16 years.  Compared 
to that baseline, it reasoned, the county’s monotheists-only rule 
was “an indisputably broad and inclusive legislative invocation 
practice.”  Id. at 285 n.4.  “[T]he practice here is in many ways 
more inclusive than that approved by the Marsh Court.”  Id. at 
285.  As a result, even after a lawmaking body opens its door 
to guest chaplains, it may still opt not “to go beyond the 
monotheistic tradition.”  Id. at 286.  But see Williamson, 928 
F.3d at 1315 (striking down county policy of chaplain selection 
that “categorically exclude[d] certain faiths — some 
monotheistic and apparently all polytheistic ones — based on 
their belief systems”). 
The Pennsylvania House pushes this exclusionary logic 
to the extreme, claiming that a prayer practice is permissible 
unless it allows chaplains from only a single sect.   The House 
emphasizes “legislatures’ long history of turning away all but 
a few faiths,” and urges that “[h]istory confirms the 
constitutionality of prayer practices far more exclusive” than 
the theists-only rule here.  Opening Br. of Appellants/Cross-
Appellees at 40.  So long as two sects are represented — even 
to the exclusion of all others — the House argues that the 
prayer practice is constitutional.  After all, by approving the 
sole use of a chaplain from a single sect for 16 years, Marsh 
was even more exclusive.  Cf. Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion 
Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (dictum) (“Marsh and Greece show that a 
government may, consistent with the First Amendment, open 
legislative sessions with Christian prayers while not inviting 
leaders of other religions.”). 
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What the House sees as the outer bound of its 
constitutional authority, its opponents abhor as the bottom of a 
slippery slope greased by our decision today.  Given the specter 
of the House’s proposed two-sect rule, amici on the side of the 
nontheists warn that their exclusion could justify barring the 
legislative pulpit to other religious minorities as well.  See Br. 
of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League et al. at 6.  If the 
House may rely on historical practice to exclude nontheists, 
may it also do so to prohibit prayers by Hindus, Jews, and 
Quakers? 
Plainly not.  To begin, our decision today rests on only 
two pillars: (1) the purpose of legislative prayer is to invoke 
divine guidance, and (2) “prayer” presupposes a higher power.  
Neither supports excluding any group of theists.  And contrary 
to our dissenting colleague’s assertion, our reasoning today 
could not be twisted to exclude Buddhists — an outcome we 
agree would be “unconscionable.”  Dissenting Op. at 7; see, 
e.g., Alex Rogers, Dalai Lama Gives Prayer on Senate Floor, 
Time (Mar. 6, 2014), https://time.com/14056/dalai-lama-
senate-prayer/ (recounting that the Dalai Lama opened his 
invocation before the U.S. Senate in 2014 with the exhortation 
to “pray to Buddha and all other gods”). 
Next, the two-sect rule is unworkable.  At what level of 
generality are we to define a sect?  Is “Christianity” a sect?  
Compare Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 
2017) (en banc) (disapproving of government’s alignment with 
the “particular faith” of Christianity), with Am. Legion, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2096 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Christianity is not a ‘sect.’”), and id. at 2107 n.7 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (“Christianity comprises numerous 
denominations.”).  If not, does Protestantism comprise one sect 
or many?  Is the Anglican Communion a single sect despite 
theological divisions among its churches? 
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More fundamentally, the two-sect rule is inconsistent 
with nondiscrimination principles in Marsh and Town of 
Greece.  Per Marsh, the “prayer opportunity” may not be 
“exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage 
any other, faith or belief.”  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95; see also 
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2088 (noting the First Congress saw 
that “legislative prayer needed to be inclusive rather than 
divisive”).   
As to the selection of the prayer-giver, Marsh instructed 
that a chaplain’s appointment could not “stem[] from an 
impermissible motive.”  463 U.S. at 793.  The Eleventh Circuit 
has read Marsh’s “impermissible motive” standard to 
“prohibit[] purposeful discrimination.”  Pelphrey v. Cobb Cty., 
547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008).  The Court concluded 
this rule had been violated when the phone book used by a 
county in Georgia to invite guest chaplains contained “a long 
and continuous line through certain categories of faiths,” 
including Muslims and Latter-day Saints.  Id. at 1282.  “The 
categorical exclusion of certain faiths based on their beliefs,” 
it explained, “is unconstitutional.”  Id.  This statement is 
enough to foreclose the House’s two-sect rule.   
But, as we have explained, a prayer by a Muslim is 
different in kind from one by a nontheist — different enough 
that a legislature may permissibly exclude the latter but not the 
former.  The Eleventh Circuit itself sees discrimination against 
theists as unlike discrimination against nontheists.  The Court 
recently drew on its rule that legislators “may not categorically 
exclude from consideration speakers from a religion simply 
because they do not like the nature of its beliefs,” Williamson, 
928 F.3d at 1299, to strike down a county’s invocation policy 
of “favoring some monotheistic religions over others and 
disfavoring and excluding — at least — religions that are 
polytheistic, pantheistic [belief that the entire universe and God 
are one — “God is everything and everything is God,” Africa, 
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662 F.2d at 1033 n.16 (quotation omitted)], or otherwise 
outside of the ‘mainstream,’” Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1311.  
But it stopped short of applying the same rule to the categorical 
exclusion of prayers by nontheists, refusing to decide “whether 
the [c]ounty is obliged to allow . . . atheists and Secular 
Humanists . . . the opportunity to deliver an invocation at the 
start of one of its board meetings.”  Id. at 1316. 
Turning to the opinion in Town of Greece, three features 
relating to nondiscrimination stand out.  First, it noted that an 
1853 study by Congress of its own prayer practice found that 
“no faith was excluded by law, nor any favored.”  Town of 
Greece, 572 U.S. at 576; see Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2089 
(“The practice begun by the First Congress stands out as . . . an 
honest endeavor to achieve inclusivity and 
nondiscrimination . . . .”).  Such a finding is inconsistent with 
the House’s proposed two-sect rule.  As to nontheists, 
however, we doubt whether the Congress of 1853 understood 
atheism as a “faith,” given that its study was from an era that 
still defined “religion” as “one’s views of his relations to his 
Creator.”  Cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).   
Second, as for the specific prayer practice at issue in 
Town of Greece, the Court stressed that the town’s selection of 
guest chaplains was admirably inclusive.  “The town at no 
point excluded or denied an opportunity to a would-be prayer 
giver.”  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 571.  “[A] minister or 
layperson of any persuasion, including an atheist, could give 
the invocation.”  Id.  Even the D.C. Circuit, in upholding 
Congress’s theists-only rule, marveled that the practice in 
Town of Greece was “significantly more inclusive than the one 
in Marsh.”  Barker, 921 F.3d at 1131. 
The en banc Fourth Circuit contrasted the inclusivity in 
Town of Greece with the comparatively “rigid, restrictive 
practice” of a North Carolina county in which only the county 
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commissioners (all Christians) were permitted to offer the 
prayer.  See Lund, 863 F.3d at 282.  “By opening its prayer 
opportunity to all comers, the [T]own [of Greece] cultivated an 
atmosphere of greater tolerance and inclusion.”  Id.  The Fourth 
Circuit struck down the county’s practice as falling short of the 
“flexible, inclusive approach” upheld in Town of Greece.  Id.  
By allowing guest chaplains of any theistic tradition, the 
Pennsylvania House is more inclusive than the county in Lund; 
by excluding nontheists, the House is less inclusive than the 
town in Town of Greece, at least as a facial matter, but 
permissibly so.   
Third, Town of Greece held that a guest chaplain policy 
resulting in prayers of predominantly one religion is 
permissible so long as the selection process is not 
discriminatory: 
That nearly all of the congregations in 
town turned out to be Christian does not 
reflect an aversion or bias on the part of 
town leaders against minority faiths.  So 
long as the town maintains a policy of 
nondiscrimination, the Constitution does 
not require it to search beyond its borders 
for non-Christian prayer givers in an 
effort to achieve religious balancing. 
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585–86 (emphasis added).  Justice 
Alito’s concurrence reinforced these nondiscrimination 
principles.  The town’s failure to invite the rabbis of certain 
Jewish synagogues “was at worst careless, and it was not done 
with a discriminatory intent.”  Id. at 597 (Alito, J., concurring).  
“I would view this case very differently if the omission of these 
synagogues were intentional.”  Id.  Likewise, the Sixth Circuit 
has taken the “policy of nondiscrimination” language in Town 
of Greece to mean that a policy of prayer-giver selection must 
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be “facially neutral.”  Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 
494, 514 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
There appears to be a dispute brewing over whether a 
“policy of nondiscrimination” is needed to render a prayer 
practice constitutional.  For Justice Kagan, “neutrality” is a 
“constitutional requirement” that calls for “pluralism and 
inclusion.”  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 616 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting); see also Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2094 (Kagan, J., 
concurring) (stressing “the values of neutrality and inclusion 
that the First Amendment demands”).  For Justice Kavanaugh, 
by contrast, equal treatment is only one way to salvage a 
challenged practice; even a non-neutral practice passes muster 
if it is “not coercive” and is “rooted in history and tradition.”  
Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
We need not resolve that issue.  The D.C. Circuit in 
Barker sidestepped the nondiscrimination requirement as 
applied to nontheists.  “[A]lthough the [Supreme] Court has 
warned against discriminating among religions,” the Circuit 
Court reasoned, “it has never suggested that legislatures must 
allow secular as well as religious prayer.”  Barker, 921 F.3d at 
1131.  We share that view. 
3. Further Inclusion is Not Needed. 
Before moving on from the Establishment Clause claim, 
we explain why a supercharged nondiscrimination rule does 
not apply to legislative prayer.  To begin, “there is no single 
formula for resolving Establishment Clause challenges.”  Am. 
Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2090 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Instead, 
legislative prayer “fits into a special nook — a narrow space 
tightly sealed off from otherwise applicable [F]irst 
[A]mendment doctrine.”  Kurtz, 829 F.2d at 1147 (R.B. 
Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  And on this doctrinal island, 
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principles of neutrality must not be so onerous that they signal 
the end of legislative prayer altogether. 
 Taken too far, a nondiscrimination rule in legislative 
prayer provides a heckler’s veto to voices on the fringe.  If, in 
the name of nondiscrimination, the House must abide prayers 
from nontheists, Satanists, and groups that deride religion, it 
will stop accepting guest chaplains altogether.  This will result 
in less diversity of religious expression — a “particularly 
perverse result.”  Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287 (upholding 
exclusion of Wiccan from prayer practice to avoid “push[ing] 
localities intent on avoiding litigation to select only one 
minister from only one faith”); cf. Freedom from Religion 
Found., Inc. v. City of Warren, 707 F.3d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 
2013) (noting, in the context of religious holiday displays, that 
“requiring governments to add all comers to the mix” would 
create a “poison pill”).  In matters of promoting religious 
diversity, the perfect should not be the enemy of the good. 
A nondiscrimination rule that regulates guest-chaplain 
programs out of existence would also be a step backward as a 
constitutional matter.  Under a permanent-chaplain model, in 
which “the governmental body hires a faith leader (necessarily 
of one faith) to say the prayers,” the risk of an impermissible 
endorsement of religion “grows, rather than diminishes.”  
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 523 (Sutton, J., concurring).  By contrast, 
the use of guest chaplains weighs in favor of constitutionality 
because it promotes diversity of religious expression.  See 
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 632 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(urging legislatures to invite “clergy of many faiths to serve as 
chaplains” so that “the government does not identify itself with 
one religion”).  Congress’s adoption of a guest-chaplain 
program in the mid-1800s allowed it to hear an opening prayer 
from a Jewish rabbi as early as 1860 and, eventually, prayers 
from Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists.  Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2088. 
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Finally, a nondiscrimination rule that parks guest-
chaplain programs would contrast incongruously with 
permissive rules for permanent chaplains.  In the world of 
permanent chaplains, a legislature may leave one paid chaplain 
from a single denomination in place for decades.  See Marsh, 
463 U.S. at 793.  For guest chaplains, however, a stringent rule 
against exclusions would mean a legislature would have to 
accept all comers.  Cf. Dissenting Op. at 15.  This asymmetry 
makes little sense. 
B. Guest Chaplain Policy – Free Speech Challenge 
The nontheists argue that the House has violated their 
free-speech rights by allowing only theistic prayers.  Because 
legislative prayer is government speech, we affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of that claim. 
1. Legislative Prayer Is Government Speech. 
Like the District Court, we conclude that legislative 
prayer is government speech.  (This conclusion bears not only 
on the free-speech claim, but also on the free-exercise and 
equal-protection claims.)  The Supreme Court has identified 
several factors relevant for distinguishing government speech 
from private speech, including a reasonable observer’s 
perception of the speaker and the government’s control over 
the message.  See, e.g., Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248–50 (2015).  
The prayer here falls on the government side of the line. 
To begin, legislative prayer is expression by a 
government.  It is “symbolic expression,” Town of Greece, 572 
U.S. at 575, that allows lawmakers to convey their own 
message by “show[ing] who and what they are,” id. at 588.  A 
legislative prayer, even one offered by a guest chaplain, is a 
“chance to pray on behalf of the government.”  Turner v. City 
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Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(O’Connor, J.) (emphasis added).  The government may 
control “what is or is not expressed” in order to “convey its 
own message.”  Simpson, 404 F.3d at 288 (quotations omitted).  
The prayer is “what a chosen agent of the government says as 
part of the government’s own operations.”  Ctr. for Inquiry, 
758 F.3d at 874.  At bottom, the government is the speaker. 
The government is the listener as well.  “The principal 
audience for these invocations is not, indeed, the public but 
lawmakers themselves.”  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587.  
Unlike prayer in schools, in the legislative setting “government 
officials invoke spiritual inspiration entirely for their own 
benefit.”  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) 
(Souter, J., concurring); see also Freedom From Religion 
Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 
896 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that legislative 
prayer is “directed at lawmakers themselves”).  This is so even 
though the prayer here is given by a member of the public who 
faces the public — the same conditions that existed in Town of 
Greece.  “[T]he government speech doctrine may apply even 
when the government uses other parties to express its 
message.”  Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 330 (1st 
Cir. 2009).  As a largely internal matter — by lawmakers and 
primarily for lawmakers — legislative prayer receives double 
deference. 
Legislative prayer is government speech even though 
some limits exist on what the government may say.  Legislative 
prayers may not “proselytize” or “denigrate” any faith, see 
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95, 
and the government may not “mandate a civic religion” by 
requiring that guest chaplains offer only nonsectarian prayer, 
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 581.  But these restrictions all 
flow from the Establishment Clause.  Because “government 
speech must comport with the Establishment Clause” anyway, 
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Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009), 
any Establishment Clause–based limits do not change the 
conclusion that legislative prayer is government speech. 
Supporting this conclusion is a recent three-Justice 
dissent from a denial of certiorari that cited Marsh as an 
example of “government-sponsored prayer” in which “the 
government itself is engaging in religious speech.”  See Morris 
Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom From Religion 
Found., 139 S. Ct. 909, 910–11 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., joined 
by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, dissenting from denial of 
certiorari).  And, as explained above, the Seventh and Fourth 
Circuits agree.  See Ctr. for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 874; Simpson, 
404 F.3d at 288. 
Evidently, only one Court disagrees.  The District Court 
in Williamson was “not persuaded that legislative prayer 
claims are necessarily subject to analysis under only the 
Establishment Clause.”  Williamson, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1294.  
Instead, it explained that the availability of a potential cause of 
action “depends on the circumstances of each case and the 
nature of the claim being asserted.”  Id.  On appeal, however, 
the Eleventh Circuit refused to adopt this case-by-case 
approach.  See Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1316 (“The trial court’s 
injunction goes too far and says too much.”).  We follow suit 
and join the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, as well as at least 
three Supreme Court Justices, in holding that legislative prayer 
is government speech. 
2. The Free Speech Clause Does Not Regulate 
Government Speech. 
Because legislative prayer is government speech, the 
analysis is straightforward.  “[T]he Free Speech Clause does 
not regulate government speech.”  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 
1744, 1757 (2017) (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 467).  The 
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nontheists’ claim thus fails.  See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287–88 
(same); see also Kurtz, 829 F.2d at 1147 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (predicting that the Supreme Court would reject a 
free-speech challenge to Congress’s theists-only chaplain 
policy and dismissing challenger’s argument to the contrary as 
exhibiting “little realism and large indulgence in wishful 
thinking”).  As a result, we affirm the District Court on this 
issue. 
C. Guest Chaplain Policy – Free Exercise Challenge 
The nontheists also challenge the guest chaplain policy 
on free-exercise grounds.  Because legislative prayer is 
government speech, the Free Exercise Clause does not apply, 
and the nontheists’ free-exercise claim fails.  See Simpson, 404 
F.3d at 287–88 (same).  Judge Niemeyer concurred in Simpson 
to stress this point: “when members of a governmental body 
participate in a prayer for themselves and do not impose it on 
or prescribe it for the people, the religious liberties secured to 
the people by the First Amendment are not directly 
implicated.”  Id. at 289 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).  In a 
subsequent Fourth Circuit case, retired Justice O’Connor 
(sitting by designation) made a similar point: although the 
challenger refused to offer a legislative prayer “in the manner 
that the government had proscribed,” he remained “free to pray 
on his own behalf, in nongovernmental endeavors, in the 
manner dictated by his conscience.”  Turner, 534 F.3d at 356.  
Because the free-exercise challenge fails, we affirm the District 
Court as well. 
D. Guest Chaplain Policy – Equal Protection Challenge  
The nontheists argue that the House’s theists-only guest 
chaplain policy violates their equal-protection rights.  But 
private citizens “have no personal interest in government 
speech on which to base an equal protection claim.”  Johnson 
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v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(citing Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1017 
(9th Cir. 2000)).  “It is the very business of government to favor 
and disfavor points of view.”  Id. at 975 (quoting Nat’l 
Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) 
(Scalia, J., concurring)).  For this reason, the Fourth Circuit has 
rejected an equal-protection challenge to legislative prayer.  
See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287–88.  The Sixth Circuit has done 
the same in the context of a city’s choice to accept some, and 
reject other, holiday displays on city property.  See Freedom 
from Religion Found., 707 F.3d at 698 (“To the extent the 
Foundation means to claim that the City’s government speech 
commemorating the holiday disparately treats its preferred 
message, the answer is: welcome to the crowd.”).  The Court 
drew on this precedent to rebuff an equal-protection challenge 
to the motto “In God We Trust” on U.S. coinage brought by 
atheists claiming the government’s speech “disparately 
treat[ed]” their views.  New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of United 
States, 891 F.3d 578, 594 (6th Cir. 2018). 
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a private 
plaintiff lacked standing to bring an equal-protection challenge 
to the Confederate flag’s presence in the Mississippi state flag, 
explaining that “exposure to a discriminatory message, without 
a corresponding denial of equal treatment, is insufficient to 
plead injury in an equal protection case.”  Moore v. Bryant, 853 
F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2017).  To be sure, the Court explained, 
“discriminatory government speech would certainly be useful 
in proving a discriminatory treatment claim, because it loudly 
speaks to discriminatory purpose.”  Id. at 251 n.4.  On its own, 
however, disparate messaging is not enough to make out an 
equal-protection violation.  “[T]he gravamen of an equal 
protection claim is differential governmental treatment, not 
differential governmental messaging.”  Id. at 250. 
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We acknowledge that the First and D.C. Circuits have 
suggested (without deciding and without explanation) that the 
Equal Protection Clause might apply to government speech.  
See Sutliffe, 584 F.3d at 331 n.9 (noting that the Equal 
Protection Clause “may be . . . another restraint on government 
speech”); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. 
Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that the Equal 
Protection Clause “might . . . limit the government as speaker,” 
but observing that “[t]he curator of a state-owned museum, for 
example, may decide to display only busts of Union Army 
generals of the Civil War, or the curator may decide to exhibit 
only busts of Confederate generals.”).  And in a concurrence in 
Summum, Justice Stevens stated that “government speakers are 
bound by” both “the Establishment and Equal Protection 
Clauses.”  Summum, 555 U.S. at 482 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
Even so, we join the authority holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause does not apply to government speech.  As a result, we 
affirm the District Court’s rejection of this claim.4 
E. Coercion Claim 
The nontheists have not appealed the District Court’s 
ruling that the House’s current practice of asking visitors to 
“please rise as able” is not coercive.  As a result, we review 
only the pre-2017 practice, which had two features.  First, the 
                                              
4  Although she didn’t couch her conclusion as a matter of 
government speech, then-Judge Ginsburg also stated that a 
nontheist’s equal-protection challenge to Congress’s theists-
only prayer policy should fail.  Because “the historic practice 
of an opening prayer burdens no ‘fundamental right’ of non-
theists,” the challenger could not “salvage his failed first 
amendment claim by cloaking it in a fifth amendment due 
process (equal protection component) mantle.”  Kurtz, 829 
F.2d at 1147 n.3 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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sign outside the House chamber read, “[a]ll guests who are 
physically able are requested to stand during [the prayer],” and 
the Speaker introduced the prayer by requesting that 
“[m]embers and all guests, please rise.”  Second, in the 2012 
incident, a House security guard singled out Fields and 
Rhoades and pressured them to stand.   
To begin, we assess whether the challenge to either 
feature is moot.  The House has voluntarily ceased both aspects 
of its pre-2017 practice.  It has amended the sign and Speaker 
statement to their current (undisputed) form, and it has 
instructed its security guards not to single out visitors who 
remain seated during the prayer. 
Voluntary cessation of challenged activity will moot a 
case only if it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful 
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”  Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
719 (2007) (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)); see also United 
States v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 
2004).  The party urging mootness bears the “heavy burden” of 
showing that it will not “revert to” its prior policy.  Trinity 
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 
2019 n.1 (2017) (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 
189). 
Here, the House continues to defend the 
constitutionality of the pre-2017 sign and Speaker statement 
despite its counsel’s statements at oral argument that it would 
not reinstate them.  As a result, it is not “absolutely clear” that 
the House would not revert to its pre-2017 policy in the future.  
In fact, it only changed the sign and statement in response to 
this litigation, which weighs against mootness.  See Marcavage 
v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 861 (3d Cir. 2012).  And the 
nontheists seek not only an injunction, but also a declaratory 
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judgment about the pre-2017 practice.  In this context, the sign-
and-statement feature of the coercion claim is not moot. 
But the 2012 incident of pressure from a security guard 
is moot.  The House has disavowed the security guard’s actions 
in this one-off incident.  See Second Br. of Appellants/Cross-
Appellees at 48 n.31 (“The House has not argued, and would 
not argue, that visitors should be publicly confronted for 
refusing to stand.”).  Its choice not to defend the security 
guard’s actions weighs in favor of mootness.  Cf. Marcavage, 
666 F.3d at 861 (finding mootness when the Park Service did 
not challenge an adverse injunction on appeal and had stopped 
enforcing its enjoined rule).  Its decision not to defend on this 
practice is wise, given that the security guard’s behavior almost 
certainly crossed the constitutional line.  See Town of Greece, 
572 U.S. at 588 (suggesting that coercion occurs when a 
lawmaker “direct[s] the public to participate in the prayers” or 
“single[s] out dissidents for opprobrium”). 
Turning from mootness to the merits of the coercion 
claim, both sides agree that Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion 
in Town of Greece controls on the question of coercion in 
legislative prayer.  See, e.g., Br. of Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
at 66 n.10; see also Lund, 863 F.3d at 286 (looking to plurality 
opinion for rule on coercion).  Aside from holding that 
legislative prayer could be sectarian, the Court in Town of 
Greece rejected the challenger’s claim that the prayer practice 
was unconstitutionally coercive.  See 572 U.S. at 591.  Writing 
for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Alito, Justice 
Kennedy stated that “government may not coerce its citizens 
to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.”  Id. at 
586 (quotations omitted).  The coercion inquiry “remains a 
fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in which the 
prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”  Id. at 
587.  (Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, would have 
gone further to hold that a prayer practice is not coercive unless 
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religious orthodoxy is enforced by “force of law and threat of 
penalty.”  Id. at 608 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quotations 
omitted).) 
Applying this “fact-sensitive” test to the House practice 
here, we hold that the pre-2017 sign and Speaker statement 
were not coercive.  To begin, the sign and statement were 
merely requests to rise, which on their own are permissible.  
See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 517 (concluding that asking “adult 
members of the public” to “ris[e] and remain[] quiet in a 
reverent position” was not coercive).  “[L]egislative prayer 
does not force religious practice on an audience.”  Mayle, 891 
F.3d at 685.  The challengers here are adults, “presumably not 
readily susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer 
pressure.”  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (quotations omitted).  Nor 
is this situation analogous to a request to stand in a school 
setting.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 596–97 (Kennedy, J.) (school-
prayer coercion case explicitly distinguishing Marsh); Town of 
Greece, 572 U.S. at 590 (explicitly distinguishing Lee). 
Next, the setting here is even less conducive to coercion 
than it was in Town of Greece.  Unlike the intimate meeting 
room there, the Pennsylvania House chamber accommodates 
over 200 members and nearly 100 visitors in the gallery.  A 
small townhall is more coercive than a large legislative 
chamber.  See, e.g., Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 625–27 
(Kagan, J., dissenting).  Unlike Pennsylvania House members, 
county commissioners and town councilors have more direct 
control over their constituents’ daily lives and typically hear 
citizen petitions immediately after the prayer.  See Lund, 863 
F.3d at 287–88. 
That Fields and Rhoades felt offended by the prayers 
does not aid their claim of coercion.  “[L]egislative bodies do 
not engage in impermissible coercion merely by exposing 
38 
 
constituents to prayer they would rather not hear and in which 
they need not participate.”  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 590. 
To be sure, one aspect of the House practice weighing 
in favor of coercion is the identity of the person asking visitors 
to rise: the Speaker of the House.  This makes the situation 
more coercive than one in which a guest chaplain makes the 
request, and it separates our case from Town of Greece.  See id. 
at 588.  The Fourth Circuit in Lund distinguished Town of 
Greece in the same way to strike down a practice in which 
county commissioners asked attendees to rise and led them in 
prayer.  See Lund, 863 F.3d at 272.  When the words “[l]et us 
pray” come from “elected representatives acting in their 
official capacity,” the Court concluded, “they become a request 
on behalf of the state.”  Id. at 287.   
Even so, two factors cut against the importance of the 
Speaker’s role in the request to rise.  His request is typically 
followed by a prayer from a guest chaplain (not from another 
lawmaker, as in Lund).  And the Speaker still asks visitors to 
rise today, yet the nontheists have abandoned their challenge 
to the current policy.   
In sum, the pre-2017 sign and Speaker statement were 
not coercive. 
Conclusion 
We affirm in part and reverse in part.  The House’s 
policy preferring theistic over nontheistic prayers does not 
violate the Establishment Clause because it fits squarely within 
the historical tradition of legislative prayer.  Next, legislative 
prayer is government speech, so the policy is not susceptible to 
an attack on free-speech, free-exercise, or equal-protection 
grounds.  Finally, the sole incident of pressure from a security 
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guard is moot, and the general practice pre-2017 of asking the 
visitors’ gallery to rise for the opening prayer was not coercive.  
  
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I join the majority opinion only with respect to the 
majority’s analysis of the Pennsylvania House’s pre-2017 
policy of requesting that members of the public “please rise” 
during opening prayers, in which the majority holds that all 
aspects of the policy are either constitutionally permissible or 
moot.  I respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority 
opinion because, in my view, the Pennsylvania House’s 
process of selecting guest chaplains violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.1 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, Plaintiffs are 
members of “religions” for purposes of the First Amendment.  
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) 
(“Among religions in this country which do not teach what 
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God 
are . . . Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism[,] and others.” 
(emphasis added)).  Plaintiffs simply seek the opportunity to 
deliver prayers at the opening of the Pennsylvania House’s 
legislative days that reflect their religious beliefs.  The 
Pennsylvania House, however, denied Plaintiffs such an 
opportunity solely on the grounds that their religious beliefs do 
not comport with the Pennsylvania House’s preferred religious 
beliefs and that Plaintiffs, thus, are incapable of delivering a 
                                              
1 Because I would hold that the Pennsylvania House’s 
guest-chaplain policy violates the Establishment Clause, I 
would not reach—and, in this opinion, I do not discuss—
Plaintiffs’ claims arising under the Free Speech and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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“prayer” within the Pennsylvania House’s conception of that 
term.  In my view, the Pennsylvania House’s policy of 
explicitly and purposefully excluding certain persons from 
serving as guest chaplains solely on the basis of their religions 
and religious beliefs finds no refuge in the history and tradition 
of legislative prayer in this country.  Further, even assuming 
arguendo that the Pennsylvania House’s purposeful 
exclusionary policy indeed fits within the history and tradition 
of legislative prayer in the United States, the policy 
nonetheless violates core tenets of the Establishment Clause by 
instituting an impermissible “religious orthodoxy,” Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581 (2014), and by, in 
effect, “direct[ing] and controll[ing] the content of . . . 
prayers,” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992). 
Rather than acknowledging these violations of the 
Establishment Clause, the majority accommodates the 
Pennsylvania House’s purposeful discrimination against 
Plaintiffs, their religions, and their religious beliefs by 
concluding that (i) “the purpose of legislative prayer is to 
invoke divine guidance,” (ii) “‘prayer’ presupposes a higher 
power,” and (iii) Plaintiffs, because their religious beliefs do 
not include a belief in a “higher power” or God, cannot offer a 
“prayer.”  This line of reasoning by necessity involves 
answering sensitive questions about what constitutes the 
“divine” and what words must be strung together for a speech 
to constitute a “prayer,” which, in my view, are precisely the 
type of questions that the Establishment Clause forbids the 
government—including courts—from answering.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
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I. 
In analyzing whether the Pennsylvania House’s guest-
chaplain policy is permissible under the Establishment Clause, 
we must “determine whether the prayer practice . . . fits within 
the tradition long followed in Congress and the state 
legislatures.”  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.  When framing 
the contours of the relevant prayer practice, courts should be 
“specific,” and “where history shows that the specific practice 
is permitted,” “it is not necessary [for courts] to define the 
precise boundary of the Establishment Clause.”  Id. (emphasis 
added) (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
In devising the key inquiry in this case, the majority, in 
my view, frames the Pennsylvania House’s guest-chaplain 
policy in a way that is too broad and that does not capture the 
true exclusionary nature of the policy.  Relying on the D.C. 
Circuit’s opinion in Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019), the majority formulates the key inquiry as whether 
“the House’s decision to limit the opening prayer to religious[2] 
prayer fit[s] ‘within the tradition long followed in Congress 
and the state legislatures,’” id. at 1130 (quoting Town of 
Greece, 572 U.S. at 577). 
Conceptualizing the Pennsylvania House’s guest-
chaplain policy as “limiting” prayer to theistic prayer is not 
technically an incorrect way to express the contours of the 
                                              
2 I assume that by “religious prayer,” the majority 
intended to convey that the Pennsylvania House “limits the 
opening prayer to theistic prayer.”  If the Pennsylvania House 
limited opening prayer to “religious” prayer, Plaintiffs would 
not have been excluded because they are indeed members of 
“religions.”  See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11.  
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policy, but framing the policy in such a way omits the most 
notable and constitutionally suspect facet of the policy:  the 
Pennsylvania House purposefully excludes adherents of 
certain religions and persons who hold certain religious beliefs 
from serving as guest chaplains and, consequently, prohibits 
them from delivering opening prayers.  Saying that the 
Pennsylvania House merely “limits” legislative prayer to 
theistic prayer fails to capture the purposeful exclusionary 
actions undertaken by the Pennsylvania House to ensure that 
its prayer practice is “limited” to theistic prayer; under the 
majority’s formulation, it is equally as likely that the prayer 
offered by guest chaplains simply is “confine[d] within [the] 
limits” of theistic prayer through no voluntary action on the 
part of the Pennsylvania House whatsoever.  Limit, Oxford 
English Dictionary (3d ed. 2014). 
By framing the Pennsylvania House’s prayer practice as 
simply being “limited” to theistic prayer, the majority’s 
ultimate holding is nothing more than a foregone conclusion:  
the prayer practice at issue in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 
U.S. at 571, which the Supreme Court upheld, could properly 
be described as one that was “limited” to theistic prayer 
because all of the guest ministers in that case belonged to 
theistic religions and were nearly all Christian.  What 
distinguishes Town of Greece from this case, however, is that 
the town council in Town of Greece “at no point excluded or 
denied an opportunity to a would-be prayer giver,” and “[i]ts 
leaders maintained that a minister or layperson of any 
persuasion, including an atheist, could give the invocation.”  
Id.  In Town of Greece, the prayers offered at the beginning of 
town board meetings were “limited” to theistic prayers simply 
by virtue of the fact that “nearly all of the congregations in 
town were Christian,” and therefore ministers of other religions 
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generally were not available to deliver the prayers.  Here, by 
contrast, the Pennsylvania House explicitly and purposefully 
excludes persons who hold Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs from 
serving as guest chaplains and from delivering opening 
prayers, but the majority’s framing of the Pennsylvania 
House’s guest-chaplain policy fails to capture this crucial 
distinction. 
Thus, in my view, the key inquiry in this case is more 
properly formulated as “whether the Pennsylvania House’s 
policy of purposefully excluding persons of certain religious 
faiths from serving as guest chaplains fits ‘within the tradition 
long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.’”  Id. at 
577.  When framed in this way, the answer to this question is 
clearly “no.”  The First Congress intended legislative prayer 
“to be inclusive rather than divisive.”  Am. Legion v. Am. 
Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2088 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.) 
(plurality opinion).  Members of the First Congress held 
divergent views regarding the motion to appoint a 
congressional chaplain, but Samuel Adams ended debate on 
the motion by supporting it:  “I am no bigot.  I can hear a prayer 
from a man of piety and virtue, who is at the same time a friend 
of his country.”  Derek H. Davis, Religion and the Continental 
Congress, 1774–1778, at 74 (2000) (quoting Adams).  
Throughout the early years of the Republic, Congress 
maintained this policy of inclusion.  In 1853, the Judiciary 
Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
concluded that “no faith was excluded by law, nor any favored” 
in the selection of congressional chaplains.  Town of Greece, 
572 U.S. at 576. 
This history demonstrates that legislative prayer, as 
envisioned by the First Congress and as subsequently practiced 
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by Congress since then, never involved the purposeful 
exclusion of persons from consideration to serve as chaplains 
on the basis of their religions or religious beliefs.  This lack of 
a history of purposeful, religion-based discrimination in 
legislative prayer is what, in my view, animates the anti-
discrimination language in Town of Greece.  See id. at 585–86 
(“So long as the town maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, 
the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders 
for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious 
balancing.”).  And by virtue of the fact that the history and 
tradition of legislative prayer in this country is thus devoid of 
any history of purposeful exclusion of persons from serving as 
chaplains based on their religions or religious beliefs, the 
Pennsylvania House’s guest-chaplain policy—which 
purposefully excludes adherents of Plaintiffs’ religions and 
persons who hold Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs from serving as 
guest chaplains—does not fit “within the tradition long 
followed in Congress and the state legislatures” and therefore 
violates the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 577. 
The majority’s response to this line of reasoning is that 
it “doubt[s] whether the Congress of 1853”—which found that 
“no faith was excluded by law, nor any favored” in the 
selection of congressional chaplains, id. at 576—“understood 
atheism as a ‘faith,’ given that its study was from an era that 
still defined ‘religion’ as ‘one’s views of his relations to his 
Creator.’”  This cannot possibly be a standard around which to 
build Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Such a standard 
would permit, for example, a legislature to purposefully 
exclude all adherents of Buddhism, the world’s fourth largest 
religion by population, from delivering legislative prayers 
because Buddhists do not believe in a “Creator”:  “If absence 
of a Creator-God is atheism, Buddhism is atheistic.”  Huston 
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Smith, The World’s Religions 114 (rev. & updated ed. 1991).  
It is unconscionable to think that the Establishment Clause 
permits legislatures to purposefully exclude all Buddhists from 
delivering legislative prayers, and it should be equally 
unconscionable to think that the Establishment Clause permits 
such purposeful exclusion of persons who hold Plaintiffs’ 
religious beliefs because there is no principled difference 
between Buddhism and Plaintiffs’ religions in this regard.3   
In sum, the majority, in my view, paints with too broad 
a brush in framing the question with respect to whether the 
Pennsylvania House’s guest-chaplain policy fits within the 
tradition of legislative prayer that has long been followed in 
Congress and the state legislatures.  The defining characteristic 
                                              
3 The fact that a Buddhist previously has delivered a 
prayer in the United States Senate is immaterial to the issue of 
whether Congress—or any other legislature—may later 
purposefully exclude Buddhists from delivering legislative 
prayers under the majority opinion.  The only manageable 
standard that I can glean from the majority opinion in this 
regard is that a legislature cannot, at some later point, 
purposefully exclude members of a nontheistic religion from 
delivering legislative prayers once that legislature welcomes a 
member of that nontheistic religion to deliver a legislative 
prayer.  Such a rule would lead to absurd results.  For example, 
the Pennsylvania Senate, which previously has welcomed 
adherents of Plaintiffs’ religions to serve as guest chaplains, 
would be prohibited from later choosing to exclude adherents 
of such religions from serving as guest chaplains, even though 
the majority today holds that the Pennsylvania House can, as a 
matter of constitutional law, exclude such persons from serving 
as guest chaplains. 
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of the Pennsylvania House’s policy is that it purposefully 
excludes adherents of Plaintiffs’ religions and persons who 
hold Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs from serving as guest 
chaplains, but the majority’s formulation of the key inquiry in 
this case omits any reference to such purposeful exclusion.  
Purposeful exclusion of adherents of certain religions or 
persons who hold certain religious beliefs has never been 
countenanced in the history of legislative prayer in the United 
States, and, therefore, viewed in the proper context, the 
Pennsylvania House’s guest-chaplain policy does not fit 
“within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state 
legislatures” because it purposefully excludes persons from 
serving as guest chaplains solely on the basis of their religions 
and religious beliefs.4  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577. 
                                              
4 I am not persuaded otherwise by what the majority 
construes as the Supreme Court’s alleged “tak[ing] as given 
that prayer presumes a higher power.”  To support this 
contention, the majority primarily cites passages from Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, and Town of Greece in which the 
Supreme Court, in the words of the majority, “described 
legislative prayer” as a practice that involves the invocation of 
a “higher power” or God.  It is only natural that the Supreme 
Court described legislative prayer in these terms:  until 
recently, nearly all legislative prayer in this country happens to 
have been explicitly theistic in nature.  It is quite a different 
thing to construe this description in dicta as tantamount to a 
holding that legislative prayer must be theistic in nature to 
qualify as such. 
The majority also lends a great deal of weight to then-
Judge Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Kurtz v. Baker, 829 
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F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987), a dissent in a case decided in 1987 
by a court of appeals other than our own.  In relying heavily on 
this dissent, the majority implicitly makes a number of 
presumptions that I am not willing to make, including (i) that 
now-Justice Ginsburg’s views on this issue have not evolved 
in the intervening thirty-two years; (ii) that Justice Ginsburg’s 
views would not change given the particular facts of this case, 
which are distinguishable from those in Kurtz insofar as the 
plaintiff in that case did not wish to deliver a “prayer,” but 
rather “opening remarks” as a “guest speaker, id. at 1146 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), whereas here, Plaintiffs explicitly 
wish to deliver “prayers” as “guest chaplains”; and (iii) that, 
for reasons not stated, the views expressed solely by Justice 
Ginsburg in a dissenting opinion in a factually distinguishable 
case decided by a court of appeals thirty-two years ago are 
apparently decisive on this particular issue. 
Finally, it is not clear to me how the Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Williamson v. Brevard County, 928 F.3d 1296 (11th 
Cir. 2019), supports the majority’s position.  The Eleventh 
Circuit did not reach the issue of whether a government can 
exclude persons with nontheistic religious beliefs from 
delivering legislative prayers, and it chose not to reach that 
issue explicitly as a matter of “judicial restraint.”  See id. at 
1317 (emphasis added) (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988)).  That court 
already had found that the relevant legislative body’s prayer 
practice “plainly” violated the Constitution, even setting aside 
the discrimination against persons with nontheistic beliefs in 
particular, and thus the court determined, as a prudential 
matter, that it was unnecessary to adjudicate any of the 
plaintiffs’ further claims.  Id. at 1316.  Thus, the Eleventh 
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II. 
 Even assuming arguendo that the Pennsylvania House’s 
guest-chaplain policy indeed fits within the tradition of 
legislative prayer that has long been followed in Congress and 
the state legislatures, that fact alone, in my view, would not 
save the policy.  The Supreme Court has held that, “standing 
alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary 
violations of constitutional guarantees” in the context of 
legislative prayer.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790; see also Town of 
Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 (“Marsh must not be understood as 
permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional 
violation if not for its historical foundation.”).  In my view, 
even if the Pennsylvania House’s exclusionary guest-chaplain 
policy fits within the history and tradition of legislative prayer 
in this country—which, for the reasons stated above, it does 
not—the policy nonetheless additionally runs afoul of the 
Establishment Clause by instituting a religious orthodoxy and 
by directing and controlling the content of legislative prayer. 
 At its core, the Establishment Clause requires the 
government to remain “neutral in matters of religious theory, 
doctrine, and practice,” and the government “may not aid, 
foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against 
another.”  Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).  
This neutrality principle mandates that the “[g]overnment may 
not . . . prescribe a religious orthodoxy.”  Town of Greece, 572 
U.S. at 581. 
                                              
Circuit did not, as the majority argues, draw a constitutional 
distinction between theistic prayer and nontheistic prayer—it 
simply concluded that it was neither necessary nor prudent to 
take up the issue of nontheistic prayer.  See id. at 1316–17. 
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 The Establishment Clause also prohibits the 
government from “defin[ing] permissible categories of 
religious speech.”  Id. at 582.  For example, “government in 
this country, be it state or federal, is without power to prescribe 
. . . any particular form of prayer which is to be used as an 
official prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally 
sponsored religious activity.”  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 
430 (1962).  The Supreme Court has held that it is a 
“cornerstone principle of . . . Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence” that the government may not “direct[] and 
control[] the content of . . . prayers” delivered at government-
sponsored public events.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 588. 
 Through the implementation of its guest-chaplain 
policy, the Pennsylvania House violates both of these tenets of 
the Establishment Clause.  By mandating that all guest 
chaplains profess a belief in a “higher power” or God, the 
Pennsylvania House fails to stay “neutral in matters of 
religious theory”; in effect, the Pennsylvania House 
“promote[s] one . . . religious theory”—belief in God or some 
sort of supreme deity—“against another”—the denial of the 
existence of such a deity.  Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103–04.  This 
is not to say that a government violates the neutrality principle 
simply by consistently selecting guest ministers who happen to 
believe in a “higher power”—legislative prayer that is even 
explicitly sectarian and almost uniformly Christian in nature 
has been approved by the Supreme Court.  See Town of Greece, 
572 U.S. at 581.  But when, as here, the government subjects 
prospective guest chaplains to a litmus test of whether they 
believe in the existence of a “higher power” or God, the 
government actively lends its power and prestige to the 
religious theory that a “higher power” or God indeed exists, 
thus violating the Establishment Clause’s neutrality principle 
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and instituting belief in a supreme deity as “religious 
orthodoxy.”5  See Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 (“When the power 
[and] prestige . . . of government is placed behind a particular 
religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious 
                                              
5 To be clear, I do not believe that the inclusion of the 
phrases “In God We Trust” on United States currency and 
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance raises similar 
constitutional concerns.  In my view, the government’s passive 
speech in the form of text on currency and through the approval 
of the official text of the Pledge is categorically different than 
the government’s actively and purposefully excluding persons 
from participating in a government-sponsored activity based 
solely on their belief or disbelief in a “higher power” or God.  
The nature of the actions are meaningfully different:  in the 
former case, the government exercises its power merely to 
approve text and mottos, but in the latter case, the government 
plays an active role, exercising its power to purposefully 
discriminate against citizens solely on the basis of their 
religious beliefs.  Indeed, even in the context of the Pledge, 
when the government has attempted to exercise its power in a 
way that exceeds the mere approval of text, the Supreme Court 
has held that such actions violate the First Amendment.  See 
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
(holding that the government cannot enforce a policy to compel 
persons to recite the Pledge because “[i]f there is any fixed star 
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,” and thus 
such a policy “transcends constitutional limitations on the[ 
government’s] power”). 
  
13 
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved 
religion is plain.”). 
 The Pennsylvania House also impermissibly directs and 
controls the content of the prayers delivered by guest chaplains 
by only permitting persons who profess a belief in a “higher 
power” or God to serve as guest chaplains.  If the Pennsylvania 
House instituted a rule that required all guest chaplains to 
include references to a “higher power” or God in their prayers, 
we undoubtedly would hold that such a rule clearly violates the 
Establishment Clause under current precedent.  Cf. Lee, 505 
U.S. at 588 (holding that the government violated the 
Establishment Clause by “advis[ing a clergyman] that his 
prayers [delivered at a high school graduation] should be 
nonsectarian” because such an attempt to “direct[] and 
control[] the content of the prayers” violates the “cornerstone 
principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that ‘it is 
no part of the business of government to compose official 
prayers’” (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 425)).  The record 
suggests that the Pennsylvania House sought to accomplish 
this very goal—ensuring that prayers include references to a 
“higher power” or God—albeit indirectly through the guest-
chaplain selection process.  For example, the Speaker of the 
Pennsylvania House testified that a “prayer” should be “an 
appeal to a benevolent higher being” and that Plaintiffs were 
excluded because they could not deliver such a “prayer.”  App. 
650:13–23 (emphasis added).  The former Speaker of the 
Pennsylvania House testified that for a “prayer” to be 
acceptable, it must be directed “to a higher being and ask[] for 
intervention,” id. at 712:18–19 (emphasis added), and that he 
would have rejected any prospective guest chaplains who 
indicated that they would not “spell [out] an actual [higher] 
being that [would] be[] addressed” in their prayers, id. at 
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714:24–25 (emphasis added).  Further, the Parliamentarian of 
the Pennsylvania House testified that he was “very concerned 
about the content” of potential prayers, id. at 519:5 (emphasis 
added), and that there was a certain “type of prayer we would 
be looking for,” id. at 523:22 (emphasis added). 
Rather than instituting an outright requirement that 
guest chaplains include references to a “higher power” or God 
in their prayers, the Pennsylvania House simply addressed the 
issue one step earlier in the process by only selecting persons 
who professed a belief in a “higher power” or God to serve as 
guest chaplains and by purposefully excluding all others.  
While this action is more indirect in nature than an outright 
requirement that guest chaplains include references to a 
“higher power” or God in their prayers, the intentional effect 
on the content of the prayers that were actually delivered is the 
same; the Pennsylvania House exerted its power over the 
guest-chaplain selection process to ensure that the “prayers 
[that were] recited . . . promote[d] a preferred system of 
belief”—namely, belief in a “higher power” or God.  Town of 
Greece, 572 U.S. at 581. 
 Thus, even setting aside the issue of whether the 
Pennsylvania House’s guest-chaplain policy fits “within the 
tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures,” 
id. at 577, the actions of the Pennsylvania House amount to an 
Establishment Clause violation.  Pursuant to the Establishment 
Clause, a government can neither institute a religious 
orthodoxy nor direct or control the content of legislative 
prayer, but here, the Pennsylvania House sought to 
accomplish—and indeed succeeded in accomplishing—both 
of these constitutionally impermissible goals. 
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III. 
A legislature is free to appoint a single chaplain, of a 
single denomination, for nearly two decades to deliver 
Christian opening prayers on an almost permanent basis, so 
long as the chaplain’s appointment and reappointment did not 
“stem[] from an impermissible motive.”  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
793.  A legislature is free to select guest ministers that are 
nearly all Christian and who deliver explicitly sectarian 
prayers, so long as the selection of such ministers “does not 
reflect an aversion or bias on the part of [legislators] against 
minority faiths.”  Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 586.  A 
legislature also is free to enact rules to exclude—as the 
majority phrases it—the “heckler,” who may, among other 
things, “denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, 
threaten damnation, . . . preach conversion,” or “disparage . . . 
other . . . faith[s] or belief[s].”  Id. at 583 (quoting Marsh, 463 
U.S. at 794–95). 
What a legislature cannot do, however, is purposefully 
exclude persons from serving as guest chaplains—and thereby 
prohibit such persons from delivering legislative prayers—
solely on the basis of such persons’ religions or religious 
beliefs.  See id. at 585–86.  Yet that is precisely what the 
Pennsylvania House did here:  the Pennsylvania House denied 
Plaintiffs—who, as the Supreme Court has recognized, are 
members of “religions” for the purposes of the First 
Amendment, see Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11—the 
opportunity to serve as guest chaplains solely on the basis of 
their religions and religious beliefs. 
The majority provides sanction to the Pennsylvania 
House’s purposeful, religion-based discrimination by 
reasoning that whether Plaintiffs are members of a “religion” 
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for the purposes of the First Amendment is immaterial to the 
question at hand; rather, the “only . . . question” that is relevant, 
in the majority’s view, is “whether [Plaintiffs] believe in a 
supreme being.”  In other words, while the Supreme Court has 
held that Plaintiffs are members of “religions” for First 
Amendment purposes, the majority holds that Plaintiffs are not 
members of “religions” for these First Amendment purposes 
because the only religions that “count” for these purposes are 
those that profess a belief in a “higher being” or God.  In 
essence, the majority, in my view, casts Plaintiffs’ religions as 
“second class.” 
The First Amendment knows no “first class” or “second 
class”; the Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit the 
government from making such distinctions.  Courts should not 
make such distinctions, and we need not make such 
distinctions—including with respect to whether persons of 
certain religions possess the ability to offer a “prayer”—to 
adjudicate the facts of this case.  When framed properly, the 
Pennsylvania House’s policy of purposefully excluding 
persons from serving as guest chaplains solely on the basis of 
their religions and religious beliefs does not fit within the 
inclusive tradition of legislative prayer that has long been 
followed in Congress and the state legislatures, and for this 
reason, among other reasons, the policy violates the 
Establishment Clause.  I thus would affirm the judgment of the 
District Court in this regard. 
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I respectfully 
dissent. 
